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PROLOGUE
Nationwide interest in the O.J. Simpson case, although somewhat
abated since 1995, continues. This is, in large part, because of the
longstanding racial divisions exposed so dramatically in the varying
responses to the October 1995 verdict in the criminal trial and the
February 1997 verdict in the civil trial. Thus, it has been recently
observed:
For two and a half persistent years, the O.J. Case has been a
grotesque but nonetheless piercing alarm telling us that there is
a racial gap so wide in this country that most white and black
Americans view the exact same events, not to mention our civic
institutions, in exactly opposite ways....
[Polls show] that the gap revealed at the criminal trial's
conclusion hadn't narrowed at all in the months since: while 74
percent of white Americans agree with the verdict in the civil
case, only 23 percent of black Americans do.'
* Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Professor Emeritus of Political Science
and of Philosophy, Dominican University; and Lecturer in the Liberal Arts, The
University of Chicago; A.B, 1948, J.D., 1951, Ph.D, 1964, The University of Chicago.
(No e-mail reception.)
1. Frank Rich, State of Denial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1997, at 17. See also Chinta
Strausberg, Did Verdict Widen the Racial Gap?, CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 6, 1997, at 8;
Chinta Strausberg, [Rev. A]] Sampson, D.C. Lawyer [Mary Cox] Say O.J. Jury
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These racial divisions are discussed in a talk I gave in November
1995, which is set forth below. That talk followed Mr. Simpson's
acquittal at the end of his criminal trial. The aftermath of that acquittal
(including the February 1997 verdict in the civil trial) is touched upon
in the notes to that talk. The racial divisions evident in the responses
to the Simpson matter reflect the lack of confidence engendered among
minorities who consider themselves the perennial victims of
unrelenting prejudice.
Appendix A, following the November 1995 talk in this Article,
records what can happen when prejudice becomes armed with the
powers of government, especially if the most sadistic men in a country
are allowed to take it over. Appendix B considers the need for special
efforts to raise up and empower chronically-depressed minorities,
especially in the face of supposed constitutional limitations with
respect to the use by government of affirmative-action measures.
Appendix C concludes these explorations by speculating about the
prospects of race relations in the United States at this time.4
'Tainted', CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 6, 1997, at 8; Carl Rowan, Both Simpson Juries Came to
Correct Verdicts, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at 35; Chinta Strausberg, Friend of
O.J. 's Says Cochran to Blame for Poor Civil Trial Defense Team, CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 8,
1997, at 6. The "racial gap" here can remind one of the "political gap" in responses to
the conviction of Alger Hiss almost a half century ago. On the Hiss case, see George
Anastaplo, The Occasions of Freedom of Speech, 5 POL. SCl. REVIEWER 383, 387 (1975).
1 have benefitted in the preparation of this and other articles from the services of
Sherman Lewis and Barbara West of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law
Library. Thanks also to Eileen Berner, Cary R. Latimer, Angela Toscas Wilt and
Stephen Wallenfelsz of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal.
2. See George Anastaplo, On Trial: Explorations, 22 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 765, 977
(1991) [hereinafter Anastaplo, On Trial]; GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST:
ON LAW, ETHICS, AND GOVERNMENT 144, 161 (1992) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE
AMERICAN MORALIST].
3. See George Anastaplo, Slavery and the Constitution: Explorations, 20 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 679, 766 (1989) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Slavery and the Constitution]; GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 181-84, 236, 455
(1995). See also infra note 67.
4. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN: ESSAYS ON VIRTUE, FREEDOM
AND THE COMMON GOOD 175 (1975) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN];
George Anastaplo, "Racism," Political Correctness, and Constitutional Law: A Law
School Case Study , 42 S.D. L. REV. 108, 164 (1997); George Anastaplo,.Allan Bloom
and Race Relations in the United States, in ESSAYS ON "THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN
MIND" 225, 267 (Robert L. Stone, ed., 1989). See also infra note 67 and accompanying
text.
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THE SIMPSON CRIMINAL TRIAL AND ITS AFTERMATH 5
Knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance.
It is knowledge of the elusive character of
the truth, of the whole.
-Leo Strauss
6
I.
My first extended commentary on the O.J. Simpson case was on
June 30, 1994, in the last session of a month-long course I was
teaching in Rome-that is, among a people who tend to be gentler and
less color-conscious than Americans are apt to be. The Simpson case
killings had occurred a fortnight before, on June 12, 1994. My next
extended commentary on the case was, in effect, in the footnotes
prepared (in March 1995) upon the publication of my June 1994 talk in
the Spring of 1995.' This talk today, my third commentary on the
case, has been prepared for the last session of our semester-long
Jurisprudence course on problems of evidence and proof.
8
Our point of departure here can be taken from the talk I gave in
Rome on June 30, 1994:
The distressing facts of the nightmarish Simpson case are,
unfortunately, already well known. They include a history of
serious spousal abuse by the principal suspect (with the
possibility of the murdered ex-spouse having herself been
somewhat provocative), remarkably violent attacks by someone
upon the ex-spouse and her friend, and the principal suspect's
bizarre efforts at postponing his arrest thereafter. (Not that the
pursuit of Mr. Simpson by the authorities and the mass media
was not also somewhat bizarre on this occasion.) The fatal
attacks upon the two victims were evidently such that they could
be depicted in the press as "a pair of unimaginably savage and
bloody crimes." One need not know the people who may have
5. This talk was given in a Jurisprudence course at Loyola University Chicago School
of Law, Chicago, Illinois, on November 21, 1995. It should be noticed that unanimity
was required for a verdict in the Simpson criminal trial, but not in the civil trial. Both
the 1995 criminal trial verdict and the 1997 civil trial verdict were unanimous.
6. LEO STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? 38 (1959).
7. See George Anastaplo, On Crime, Criminal Lawyers, and O.J. Simpson: Plato's
Gorgias Revisited, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 455 (1995) [hereinafter Anastaplo, On Crime].
My fourth commentary on the Simpson case (as of March 1997) may be found in the
prologue, epilogue, notes and appendices for this Article.
8. The principal texts for the Fall 1995 Jurisprudence course were Aristotle's Physics
and Francis Bacon's Novum Organum. In later semesters, the principal texts have been
the Bible and Shakespeare. See George Anastaplo, On Freedom: Explorations, 17 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 465, 724-26 (1992) [hereinafter Anastaplo, On Freedom: Explorations].
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been involved here to recognize that something is dreadfully
wrong with the man or men who did what is reported here,
whoever he or they may be.9
Immediately to be added to this account is the fact that a long-suffering
jury, on October 3, 1995, acquitted Mr. Simpson on all criminal
counts, after nine months of trial and five hours of deliberation.
The Simpson case cannot be discussed sensibly without at least a
provisional opinion as to what the truth is about who killed the two
victims. An inquiry into any matter has to work from premises. The
sounder those premises, the better the inquiry is likely to be.
Soundness here includes an awareness of one's provisional opinion
and the limitations of that opinion. The perspective from which we
approach such matters is not that of the professional investigator, but
rather that of the citizen who assesses the information which happens
to have been made available by investigators and others.'0
My provisional opinion as to the truth in this matter is reflected in
my expectations about the outcome of the criminal trial. First, there
was my expectation in March 1995, at the time that I prepared my June
1994 talk for publication. I wrote in the final footnote for that article:
My own guess is that if the trial does happen to end in a hung
jury (an outright acquittal seems highly unlikely), the
prosecution will probably consider itself obliged to try the
defendant again, especially if the State's evidence has been
revealed to be as strong as it now appears it will be. By then the
defense, with its material (and perhaps spiritual) resources
depleted, may be disposed (if Mr. Simpson is physically
responsible for the killings) to enter into a plea bargain on an
insanity-related manslaughter charge.'
Thereafter, the State's evidence was shown to be quite strong indeed.
But, at the same time, various other factors, such as one police
officer's obvious racism and the appearance of incompetence among
some technicians used by police, permitted a plausible questioning of
what the evidence meant. Even so, when we learned last month that
the jury in the criminal case had decided as quickly as it did (after
having asked to hear again only the limousine driver's testimony), I
believed that conviction was likely. It seemed to me, that is, that the
9. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 458. The "bizarre efforts" referred to include
the Bronco chase, which the prosecution did little, if anything, with in the criminal trial
but which the plaintiffs' attorneys used in the civil trial. See infra notes 15, 25.
10. This double-killings case is considered closed by the Los Angeles Police
Department. See Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 465 n.23. See also infra note 39
and accompanying text.
11. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 470 n.33.
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kind and amount of evidence provided by the State in the criminal case
would have impressed at least a few on the jury, requiring some time
for them to be argued into an acquittal by those disposed to acquit for
whatever reason.
Still, it should be noted that most lawyers evidently did not expect a
conviction. Thus, in late February 1995, this report was published:
As the trial of O.J. Simpson moves into its fourth week, 70
percent of the nation's lawyers have come to believe the
celebrity defendant will [because of racial differences among
the jurors] not be convicted of killing his ex-wife, Nicole Brown
Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman-an increase of
nearly 10 percent from five months ago.1 2
On the second day of the State's closing argument (September 27,
1995) 1 polled my Constitutional Law II students by secret ballot. Of
the 35 students who responded, only three of them indicated the belief
that Mr. Simpson had not done the killings; 32 said he did them. Of
these 32, eight students predicted he would be convicted; nine that
there would be a hung jury; and 15 that he would be acquitted. Thus,
of the 32 who believed Mr. Simpson had done the killings, only one-
fourth believed he would be convicted. (This was even before defense
counsel played whatever "race card" was used in closing argument.)
After the students had voted, they asked me for my opinion. I replied
that I believed both that Mr. Simpson had done the killings and that he
would be convicted. Perhaps the most significant fact about all this is
something that I have not seen referred to elsewhere: few if any of our
fellow citizens (whether "pro-Simpson" or "anti-Simpson") believed
that an innocent man would be convicted on this occasion. That could
be interpreted as a sign of some progress in race relations in this
country. Another such sign is the general impression that if Mr.
Simpson is not responsible for these killings, they were not done by
any African-American. The savagery unleashed here strongly
suggests a "personal" relation between the killer or killers and at least
one of the victims.
No one seems to dispute the opinion that in an ordinary murder trial,
the kind and amount of evidence that was produced by the State in the
Simpson trial would have secured a conviction, regardless of the race
either of the defendant or of the jury. Circumstantial evidence can be
very strong; sometimes it can be superior to more direct evidence (such
as eyewitness testimony). We rely upon circumstantial evidence all the
12. Id. at 470 n.33.
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time. Indeed, we would be virtually paralyzed in our everyday
activities if we did not.
We have become so accustomed to, if not corrupted by,
disparagements of government that we fail to appreciate what an
elaborate, and hence highly vulnerable, chain of acts would have been
required to establish and maintain the anti-Simpson conspiracy
suggested by defense counsel in the Simpson case. Such an effort
would have had to start quite early after discovery of the killings,
without knowledge of what Mr. Simpson would be able to provide in
the way of an alibi or other evidence in his defense. And it would
have had to have been done with considerable skill, and at
considerable risk to their careers, by people otherwise condemned by
defense counsel as generally incompetent. 3 If such a conspiracy was
ever engaged in, any "repentant" participant could now make himself
wealthy by exposing the plot. After all, fortunes have already been
promised in contracts for other "inside stories" about the case.
We should be clear, in any event, what a criminal-trial jury verdict
does and does not mean. An acquittal does mean-and virtually
everyone agrees that it should continue to mean-that a defendant can
never be prosecuted again by the same government for the same crime.
Thus, Mr. Simpson is now "free" of any liability (in a California state
court) for murder, whatever evidence may turn up hereafter. (Could
he be tried for soliciting murder or a related crime if it should ever be
learned that he got someone else to do a killing, or that he helped the
killer do it, or that he helped him to escape detection?)
An acquittal in a case does not mean that a defendant did not do the
crime. Nor does it mean that the community at large should regard an
acquitted defendant as not having done the crime of which he has been
acquitted. There are standards with respect to truth and falsity which a
jury verdict may help us apply, but with respect to which such a
verdict cannot be conclusive. Truth, in short, is not something that
"automatically" results from an operation or a method. 4
1 3. See Gale Holland & Jonathan T. Lovitt, Jurors Detail the Thinking that went into
their Ruling, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1997, at IA: "Most jurors said the defense put on a
strong case [in the civil trial] of possible police contamination of evidence and
conspiracy. But in the end, [defense] theories were too speculative, jurors said, too
much of a reach." Professor Albert Alschuler, of the University of Chicago Law School,
has observed, "The American justice system often gets it right the second time around."
Ken Armstrong & Flynn McRoberts, Civil Case Meant 2nd Trial Was in Different
League, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 1997, § 1, at 20. See also infra note 40 and Editorial, The
Second Simpson Verdict, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1997, § 1, at 26. Compare Yale Kamisar,
Call It Double Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at A23.
14. Much the same can be said, for example, about what Oliver North's successful
criminal-conviction appeal does and does not mean. Consider also how physicists
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However much the purpose of a trial may be furthered by seeking
the truth about the matter under consideration, a trial is not primarily a
search for truth but rather a search for justice. That is, it is an effort,
in accordance with established and known rules, to find the best way
of dealing with a disputed matter of a legal character. It can be
ominous when it is believed, as may be seen in my classroom poll,
that the guilty-when skillfully represented-will not be convicted of a
grave criminal offense. But whatever problems we may have with the
verdict in the Simpson murder trial, perhaps all this can still be put to
good use, especially if we try to understand the various participants
and what they were thinking.
II.
What were the jurors in the criminal case thinking? Were they
angry, frustrated, bamboozled-or simply doing what has traditionally
been expected of them? Some have argued that this jury "sent a
message," exercising the power (if not the right) of "nullification" long
available to determined juries. Precisely what the "message" was in
this case may not be clear. The experts who predicted an acquittal
placed special emphasis upon the "racial dynamics" in the situation and
upon the deep sense of grievance among African-Americans about
how they are routinely treated by the police and the criminal-justice
system. There is certainly something to this explanation.
Other experts, commenting on the verdict, have been critical of the
way the State conducted its investigation and presented its case., 5
Even so, as I have noticed, it seems to be generally recognized that a
defendant confronted with the "mountain of evidence" available in this
case, and with no alibi evidence, will usually be convicted.1
6
operate-as, for example, when they look to a mechanical operation to determine what
they call a "vacuum." But must there not be a standard (of what a vacuum would truly be)
that helps them see what operation or method does a better job in developing a vacuum?
Also, I note in passing, it may not be possible to have a true vacuum if there are
gravitons which are responsible for gravity: the pull of gravity is everywhere, however
minute it may be in some places. On the mystery of Being and Nothingness, see GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST: FROM HOMER TO PLATO & ARISTOTLE 301 (1997)
[hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST].
1 5. The same experts (such as Philip Corboy and Scott Turow) have spoken with more
respect about how the civil trial against Mr. Simpson was conducted. See Bob Kurson,
Bottom Line for O.J.: He's Going to Suffer, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at 6. See also
supra note 9; infra note 25.
16. Among the advantages that the plaintiffs' lawyers had in the civil trial, with its
lower standard of proof to meet, was the damaging testimony of Mr. Simpson himself.
See, e.g., Armstrong & McRoberts, supra note 13, § I, at 20 (quoting Professor Jamie
Carey of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law); Jonathan T. Lovitt & Richard
Price, Plaintiffs' Best Witness Was O.J., USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 1997, at IA.
1997]
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Typically, in fact, such a situation will find conscientious defense
counsel negotiating a plea bargain with a view to avoiding a death
sentence. That is, prosecutors who are far less prepared than the State
was in the Simpson case routinely prevail in such cases-and there is
not much doubt in the community at large about the guilt of almost all
those who are imprisoned for crimes of violence in this country.
The verdict 'in the Simpson case raises questions about what
"reasonable doubt" can mean in the typical case where circumstantial
evidence is critical. Related to this are questions about what has been
happening to the popular judgment, inundated as the public is by
fanciful stories in the mass media about conspiracy theories, pseudo-
sciences, abductions by aliens in UFOs, and the like. The general
sense of the probable seems to need strengthening, even as sloppy
thinking needs to be questioned. 7
The Simpson jury might have been more tough-minded if it had
been "qualified" for the death penalty.'8 Certainly, a better educated
jury is needed in cases where racial prejudice may be a problem and
where scientific evidence has to be relied upon.' 9 There is much to be
said for the English mode of selecting juries, which can produce
competent juries within hours. Much is also to be said against
extended sequestration of a jury, which is likely to affect adversely the
mental balance of those subjected to such abuse.2"
It is likely that some of the defects of the Simpson trial and of this
jury can be attributed to the way that the trial judge ran his courtroom.
Christopher Darden, a member of the unsuccessful criminal trial prosecution
team, said the difference in the civil case was that Simpson had to testify.
'O.J. lied in front of this jury, he lied to the black community, and he lied to
the American public. This jury focused on the evidence, not on race or
politics,' he said.
Patrick Brogan, Civil Defeat Has Simpson Facing Ruin, GLASGOW HERALD, Feb. 6,
1997, at 13. What safeguards would be needed if defendants in non-political criminal
cases were required to testify? Defense attorneys are sure, in any event, that juries do
take into account the lack of testimony from defendants. See infra note 25.
17. See George Anastaplo, Lessons for the Student of Law: The Oklahoma Lectures,
20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 187 (1995). See also infra notes 23, 59.
1 8. On capital punishment, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at
422. See also Editorial, A Lawyerly Cry of Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1997, at
16; Editorial, Reality Check on the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1997, § I, at 14.
19. On the American jury, see Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 470 n.33.
20. Our extended jury sequestrations are resorted to partly because of the considerable
leeway usually allowed both to the mass media in covering a trial and to counsel in
publicly commenting upon it daily. See, e.g., James Brooke, Newspaper Says McVeigh
Told [His Lawyers] of Role in Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1997, at 1. No extended
sequestration was required in Mr. Simpson's civil trial. A jury is somewhat like the fox
in an organized hunt, defining the course that the chase is to follow.
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(This is aside from concerns that observers have had about the
corrupting effects upon participants, as well as upon the general
public, of televising the trial of a celebrity.2") This entire matter should
have been disposed of, at the trial level, before the end of 1994, rather
than stretching out as it did to October of 1995. The tighter the trial
run by a fair-minded judge, the more likely it is that the verdict will be
rendered promptly and will be generally accepted as sensible. The
way the judge in the Simpson criminal case permitted himself to be
overwhelmed by high-powered lawyers was anything but reassuring.
Much can be said for continued reliance upon trial by jury in this
country, however more disciplined everyone involved in a trial such as
this should be. A properly supervised jury trial tends to assure people
that only the guilty are likely to be convicted and that the State is likely
to be held in check when it relies upon inadequate evidence or upon
political prejudices. It is hard, therefore, to overestimate the social
value of reliance upon trial by jury in contested cases.22 It is easy, but
not sensible, to attribute to the criminal-law system in general the
social and other failings exposed by this bizarre case.
Whatever reservations one may have about the caliber of the jury in
the Simpson case, it is prudent to keep in view the extent to which
ordinary citizens are being led astray by irresponsible people of
influence who should know better. Consider, for example, the
conspiracy theory, self-righteously insisted upon by well-financed
partisans (month after month), which seems to question whether an
unfortunate Presidential aide, Vincent Foster, really committed suicide.
One can be reminded, by our own irresponsibility, of what has been
happening in Israel in recent years:
At a gathering in Jerusalem of national religious parties [after
the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin], one
repentant leader, Rabbi Yehuda Amital from the Meimad Party,
remarked that the assassin may have been following overzealous
religious-Zionist teaching. Amital called for rabbis to stop
mixing politics and religion: "We are guilty of educating an
entire generation to primitive thinking through clich6s. ' 23
21. Mr. Simpson's civil trial was not televised. On the abolition of broadcast
television, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at 245.
22. For an account of the woman with "second sight" in my parents' village in
Greece, see id. at 388.
23. Storer H. Rowley, As Crackdown Looms, Settlers Tone Down, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
10, 1995, § I, at 26. See also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Worst Corruption, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 22, 1995, at AI0. See, as well, Anastaplo, On Freedom: Explorations, supra
note 8, at 622-25; ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 155-59. On
Vincent Foster and related matters, see Robert L. Bartley, Whitewater Reconstructed,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1996, at A12; Editorial, 'Pattern of Obstruction,' WALL ST. J.,
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III.
We turn now from the jury and the judge to the lawyers in the
Simpson case. What were those lawyers thinking? One could well
wonder how much such sentiments as the following apply to their
calculations about the ways they should conduct themselves:
Generally speaking, a community's dignity and self-respect
would be best served if the obvious and the obviously just were
acted upon promptly. Would not everyone be usefully shaped
and properly restrained by such an approach? Instead, . . . the
most celebrated lawyers in our country are licensed to practice
systematic distortion of the truth and avoidance of the just
dispositions of cases. Should we not be almost as vigilant about
defense counsels' misconduct here as about prosecutors'
misconduct? 2
4
One suspects that the prospects of multi-million dollar book deals
made much more sense to the lawyers in this case than the kind of
"moralizing" evident in the sentiments just quoted.
A serious rebuke for the prosecuting lawyers is implicit in their
inability to secure a conviction, or at least a hung jury, despite the
considerable evidence they had available to them. The use they made
of a racism-vulnerable detective was, to say the least, imprudent,
especially after they elected to try the case where they did. The detail
which the prosecutors insisted upon in making their case probably
contributed to the deadening of the sensibilities, including the moral
sensibilities, of the jury.25
June 19, 1996, at A20; Editorial, Mr. Foster & Mr. Livingstone, WALL ST. J., July 12,
1996, at A12; Trude B. Feldman, The President at 50, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1996, at A14;
Editorial, Privileged First Lady, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1996, at AI0; Eugene H.
Methvin, Justice Without Fear or Favor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A18; Editorial,
The White House Conspiracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at A18; Clarence Page,
Paranoia Rules, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1997, § 1, at 21; Anthony Lewis, Ken Starr's
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at A19; Anthony Lewis, Closure on Vince Foster,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at A15. See also supra note 17.
24. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 468. See also ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORALIST, supra note 2, at 185. On how defendants should conduct themselves, see
ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 8, 203; the epigraph for infra
Appendix A. Consider, as well, how attorneys for tobacco companies should conduct
themselves.
25. For a preliminary account of the way the plaintiffs' case in the civil trial was
presented, see Elaine Lafferty, The Inside Story of How O.J. Lost, TIME, Feb. 17, 1997,
at 29. See also Christopher Darden, Justice Is In the Color of the Beholder, TIME, Feb.
17, 1997, at 38. Mr. Darden, a prosecutor in the Simpson criminal trial, concludes his
article thus, "Given the wealth of evidence against Simpson, the fact he remains free
while others are convicted on one-tenth the evidence is fundamentally unfair. I don't
expect that he'll ever pay for his crimes." Id. at 39. Compare R. Bruce Dodd, An
Amazing State of Affairs, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1997, § 1, at 27; supra notes 9, 15.
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The defense lawyers may be, by far, the most interesting of all the
"players" in this drama. They may also be the furthest from what they
should have been, coming closest to the "rogue" status assigned by
them to a few members of the Los Angeles Police Department. In a
sense, the conduct of defense counsel has to be more self-regulated
than that of any other officer in the criminal-justice system. Defense
counsel, if "successful" at the trial level, are less subject to correction
on appeal than are judges, juries, or prosecutors: if they should secure
an acquittal from the jury the criminal case is almost certainly over.
One consequence of this is that defense counsel may "safely" resort to
sophistry and other abuses in the service of their client. This
observation invites a question that is remarkably difficult for both law
students and experienced lawyers to understand, let alone take
seriously: If Mr. Simpson did the savage things that were done to the
victims in this case, did his counsel act in his interest by securing his
acquittal? It is easy, in the excitement of a case, to be caught up by the
apparent goodness of "winning." We repeatedly heard references to
the "Dream Team" of lawyers engaged for the Simpson defense, as if
this trial had been a basketball game. (The original "Dream Team,"
contrived for the Olympic Games, was also misconceived. NBA
professionals have no business competing in those Games--or, rather,
basketball is too much of a business for them to be there. It is hardly
their sporting thus to insist upon exhibiting what everyone knows
about their preeminence.)
What did Mr. Simpson's lawyers really believe about his guilt? Do
they tend to believe that one is guilty only if a judge or jury so rules?
This would be a peculiar way to define "justice," however practical it
may be for a decent community to rely considerably upon what the
criminal-justice system happens to produce on any particular occasion.
If lawyers do come to be seen as having no standards aside from what
happens to be arrived at in court, then respect for the system itself will
suffer:
Whenever lawyers conduct themselves in questionable ways it is
not likely to be good for the community, or for the lawyers'
clients (whether individuals or the state), or for the lawyers
themselves. Such conduct tends to promote cynicism, self-
centeredness, and eventually the feeling among lawyers (as well
as among others) that the legal profession, if not life itself, is
meaningless. Particularly worrisome here is that the legal
profession, which should be and should appear to be made up
Compare also the quotation in the text accompanying infra note 31; infra notes 33, 39.
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of reliable ministers of justice, is steadily demeaned, even as
there is radical disaffection in the subverted community.
26
I have the impression that only a small minority of informed people
in this country consider Mr. Simpson innocent. Do the Simpson
lawyers now truly believe that he is innocent? Do they know
something that most of us do not know? Or are they deluded because
of their calling, perhaps becoming thereby the most serious victims of
the legal system as it has developed? And yet these lawyers appear the
most successful and the most sophisticated of lawyers. If the Simpson
lawyers believe him to have done the killings, what good do they see
for the community, as well as for him, in his "vindication"? All this is
a sad state of affairs for practitioners who were probably first drawn to
the law because of their high-minded dedication to the cause of justice
and the common good.
IV.
I have considered what the jurors, and to some extent the judge, in
the Simpson case were thinking. I have also considered what the
lawyers in the case were thinking. What about Mr. Simpson himself?
If he did do the two killings, it could not have been altogether on
impulse. That is, there are indications that the killer made
preparations, if only with respect to the knife, clothing, and schedule
relied upon. If Mr. Simpson did the killings, what did he believe
would happen? Did he wonder whether he, a "likely" suspect, would
have an adequate alibi? How could Mr. Simpson, if he set out to kill,
be sure that no one would see him in the neighborhood? The
thoughtlessness evident here may be seen as well in the spousal-abuse
episodes connected to him, episodes that would immediately make him
a suspect when his ex-wife was slaughtered.27
Those episodes testify to passions that may be hard to predict or to
control altogether. Certainly there were intense passions exhibited in
26. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 468. See also George Anastaplo,
Individualism, Professional Ethics, and the Sense of Community: From Runnymede to a
London Telephone Booth, 28 Loy. U. CM. L.J. 285 (1997); George Anastaplo,
Teaching, Nature, and the Moral Virtues, in 1997 THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY (forthcoming
1997); George Anastaplo, Natural Law or Natural Right? 38 LoY. L. REV. 915 (1993).
"It's that mixture of sophistry with conformity that frightens me about most lawyers.
Perhaps it's because they're closer to the moral vacuum of our times than anyone else.
The O.J. spectacle might not be law's embarrassment, but its true and empty core." Pat
Kane, Smooth Talkers Who Know the Score, GLASGOW HERALD, Feb. 6, 1997, at 19.
The well-meaning sophistry of Professor Alan M. Dershowitz, as a commentator on the
Simpson cases, has been instructive.
27. On Mr. Simpson as a witness, see supra note 16.
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the killings themselves, especially in the extension of the violence
against what seems to have been an innocent bystander, the companion
of the apparently targeted woman. Even so, it is becoming evident that
Mr. Simpson is not of much consequence "personally," however
sincerely he could once be described by a veteran sportswriter as one
of "the most genuinely good-natured people I've ever met." 28
If Mr. Simpson did the killings, he is (in a layman's terms)
probably crazy.29 Symptoms of craziness may be seen in his evident
expectation that he would once again be able to hobnob with the rich
and powerful upon his release, whereas the only people who now
support him in sizable numbers are among the poor or alienated of his
race, with whom he has had little to do since he became a celebrity.
How did Mr. Simpson, if a savage killer, get to be the way he is? He
can be accounted for by a peculiar combination of natural talent and
early mistreatment, mistreatment of which we have had only glimpses
thus far. (In more ways than one he seems to consider himself
"abused." There may be something to this.)
Has this man, if a killer, also come to consider himself truly
innocent? However that may be, he probably is not so innocent even
in his own estimation that he can admit to the deeds and still be able to
justify them.3 ° He is, in critical respects, a contrived figure, pointing
up for us problems with the modern celebrity phenomenon. Unless
there is a profound religious conversion, he can be expected to
deteriorate in the years ahead, especially since there does not appear to
be anything solid or enduring inside. He said, shortly after his
acquittal, that he would devote himself to the pursuit of the killer of his
ex-wife and her companion. He may have spoken more truly than he
realized: one way or another he may be pursuing-that is, he may be
trying to come to terms with-the killer within himself.
I return here to observations made in my June 1994 talk in Rome
and published in my 1995 article on the Simpson case:
Thus, would it not be better for someone in O.J. Simpson's
situation (if that situation is indeed what it appears to be) simply
to acknowledge what he did and thereafter to accept the
appropriate punishment and treatment? It should now be
obvious that Mr. Simpson himself, whether or not guilty on this
occasion, was not served well by the legal system (and perhaps
by his counsel) when he was questioned about severe attacks
28. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 465 n.25 (quoting Bob Costas).
29. See id. at 464 (a comment upon the John Wayne Gacy case). On psychiatry and
the law, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at 407.
30. Compare Raskolnikov in FIODOR DOSTOYEVSKI, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
19971 473
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
upon his wife over the years. Did he, with the aid of skillful
counsel, really "get away with it" on those occasions? Perhaps
he was encouraged to believe that he was the victim, that there
was a conspiracy against him, etc. It is natural for the
perpetrator of awful deeds to try to blame them upon, if not
even physically to assign them to, someone else. Intense guilt
can often lead one to desperate efforts to wish away, to deny,
indeed to blot out of one's memory, what has been done. But
in whose interest is it that one should be allowed to live a lie in
this way for the remainder of one's years? Certainly, a healing
and enduring peace of soul is not to be secured thus. 1
What, then, would be truly good for a man in Mr. Simpson's dreadful
circumstances? True repentance and facing up to what he has done
and why, the old-fashioned moralist would have said. The recent
NBC-interview fiasco is revealing: it is probably becoming apparent
even to Mr. Simpson that there are limits now to the manipulation by
him that can work in the conduct of his life. Brutal, even cruel, jokes
about him suggest the hopelessness of the efforts that might now be
made to rehabilitate him, jokes that began at once on the airwaves.32
V.
The key issue never has been, it seems to me, whether Mr. Simpson
serves time in prison. He is, if the killer, already a prisoner of his past
and his passions. For most of us, it is as if he is already put away.
For some, however, it remains vital that he be "officially" recognized
as a killer." The civil suits brought against him offer hope to some.
They are looked to as a way of clarifying matters, as well as a way of
keeping him from profiting financially from his notoriety. (There does
not seem to be, unlike what happened to the police officers exposed on
videotape in the 1991 Rodney King matter, the possibility of a federal
criminal trial to begin to make up for what was not done in the state
criminal trial.) But what more is there to learn from what is likely to
be said by Mr. Simpson or by anyone else in court at this time?
Perhaps the civil suits can at least help persuade impressionable people
3 1. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 466-67.
32. Particularly rough was the "humor" about Mr. Simpson on Saturday Night Live
the first weekend after his acquittal. Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast,
Oct. 7, 1995). For comments on the aborted television interview, see Bill Carter,
Simpson Cancels TV Interview, But Talks of Life Since Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1995, at Al; David Margolick, Late Meetings Led to Cancellation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1995, at B7; Frank Rich, The Second Wind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1995, at 19; Lawrie
Mifflin, NBC Confronts the 'What If's' of Simpson Coup That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 1995, at D7.
3 3. See Genesis 4:15. Compare supra note 25, infra note 39.
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that to escape conviction in a criminal trial does not mean that one has
really "gotten away with it." People also need to be persuaded that the
rich and the powerful do not readily get away with murder in this
country. The convictions of businessmen, members of Congress, and
judges on lesser charges remind us that influence is not always enough
to protect one in criminal proceedings. We can see as well that
influential men and women can be trapped by the illusions spun
around them. (Perjury prosecutions, of the type which some hope
may follow upon Mr. Simpson's testimony in a civil suit, seem to be
rare. 34 )
It will be interesting, in any event, to see what happens to Mr.
Simpson's support, such as it is, once a long-term opinion about him
becomes settled. The degree of support for him in the African-
American community is instructive. Part of that support is an
instinctive "closing of ranks" by a people behind "one of their own."
This sort of response was seen, for example, on more than one
occasion during the notorious political career of James Michael Curley
in Boston, with the Irish-American community coming to his support
again and again. Once, indeed, he was elected to office while serving
time in jail.35
Then there was the way that the Greek-American community closed
ranks behind Spiro T. Agnew, even after it became evident that he had
been accepting bribes (still "due" to him from his years as Governor of
Maryland) while Vice President of the United States. It did not seem
to bother most of the Greek-American community that Mr. Agnew
(who preferred to be called "Ted" rather than "Spiro") never showed
much interest in the Greek community, except as a source of campaign
contributions. Even worse was what the Greek-American community
did, between 1967 and 1974, in supporting the Colonels' coup in
Greece, a coup which led eventually to the subjection, for more than
twenty years, of a significant portion of Cyprus to Turkish rule.
Without the pressure from the Greek-American community, the
American State Department would probably have conducted itself more
sensibly in dealing with the Colonels, including their irresponsible
policy with respect to Turkey.36
34. See, e.g., Editorial, The Simpson Finale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1997, at A14.
35. See JACK BEATTY, THE RASCAL KING: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MICHAEL
CURLEY, 1874-1958 77-91 (1992). One can be reminded here of the current career of
Mayor Marion Barry in Washington, D.C.
36. On Spiro T. Agnew, see George Anastaplo, Education of Agnew-and of Us All,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 1973, § 1, at 18. On Cyprus and the Greek Colonels, see George
Anastaplo, Bloodied Greece: No Way Out? BALT. SUN, Apr. 19, 1974, reprinted in 120
CONG. REC. 14,371 (May 13, 1974); 120 CONG. REC. 15,597 (May 20, 1974).
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Unlike the bulk of Greek-Americans, many others in this country
could easily see the Greek Colonels for what they were: incompetent
usurpers who were good for neither Greece nor the United States. It
was not surprising that Americans at large were without the illusions
that the more influential Greek-Americans had about the Colonels who
flattered and appealed to them." The same can be said about the large
majority of whites who appreciated the considerable case that had been
mounted against Mr. Simpson during his trial. Thus, African-
American support for O.J. Simpson is, in part, rooted (how deeply
remains to be seen) in the same kind of allegiance exhibited by Greek-
Americans when they supported Spiro Agnew and the Colonels and by
Irish-Americans when they supported James Curley. This sort of
thing, it can be said, is natural.
VI.
But there is even more to the African-American show of ethnic
allegiance in the Simpson case than there is to how Irish-Americans
and Greek-Americans have conducted themselves from time to time.
The responses of African-Americans to the Simpson case, I have
noticed, testify to depths of alienation, if not even of despair, that the
other minority groups in this country (except perhaps for Native
Americans) have not fallen into. (Both African-Americans and Native
Americans do seem to be in need of whatever help can be provided
them by sensible affirmative-action programs.) There is something
desperate about the African-American situation, as may be seen in
what kind of a man can be turned (albeit temporarily) into a "hero." (It
may be significant that Colin Powell does not stir up the same degree
of passion among African-Americans that certain other leaders of their
race do, even though it should be evident that the more strident leaders
in any minority group, not being apt to arouse much general support
among the majority, will be of limited influence in the community at
large.)
It is sometimes recognized that whites do not see what African-
Americans routinely experience and see. That experience includes the
kind of thing exposed in the vicious treatment of Rodney King by his
arresting policemen in Los Angeles. Even worse may be what a
largely white jury did in acquitting those policemen. But a critical
difference should be noted (in addition to the successful, however
37. See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 3; GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER: FROM SHAKESPEARE TO JOYCE 331 (1983);
ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at 501; infra note 48.
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questionable, effort we have seen to get at those policemen in a
subsequent federal criminal trial). It has been reported that groups of
African-American students all over this country responded with
"jubilation" upon learning of the Simpson acquittal.38 Perhaps such
students could not "help themselves," a weakness that their teachers
should try to remedy. But it should at least be recognized that there
evidently was not such jubilation expressed by mainstream students of
any color when Rodney King's assailants were acquitted. Would we
not have been deeply troubled upon learning that any group of, say,
white Loyola law students had publicly responded in this fashion on
that occasion?
One hopeful sign in all of this is that those African-Americans who
defend the Simpson criminal-trial verdict do not usually put it simply
in terms of "payback time." Rather, they talk about "police
conspiracy" and "reasonable doubt" in justifying the jury's refusal to
defer to the considerable case evidently made against Mr. Simpson.
That is, they do not want to seem or, indeed, be unprincipled or
arbitrary on this occasion. They should be taken at their word as we
try to assess what happened and why.
Two sets of opinions, from the sidelines so to speak, should be
noted here. There is one set of opinions about the Simpson case that I
have heard from several African-Americans during the past year. They
have now and then expressed the conviction that although Mr.
Simpson did not commit the killings, he knows who did them. 39 This
bears thinking about, perhaps as a partial recognition of Mr.
Simpson's role in all of this. Another set of opinions that bears
thinking about may be found in a letter of October 10, 1995, from a
white police officer whom I know and respect, written to me from a
Northern California city:
When the verdict was read I was struck by a nearly
overwhelming sense of despair. As a police officer, I thought I
was familiar with the vagaries of our justice system, but still felt
optimistic about the ability of the jurors to do what was right.
It was difficult to go to work the day of the verdict. We had lost
our credibility. I realized that our effectiveness was not a
38. One such group seems to have been at the Howard University School of Law,
Washington, D.C. See INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 6, 1995. See also David K. Shipler,
Living Under Suspicion: Why Blacks Believe Simpson and Not the Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1997, at A17.
39. This could mean that Mr. Simpson is protecting a dangerous killer who is free to
move around. See supra note 10. On the other hand, if Mr. Simpson is the killer, he is
not likely to kill anyone else again, whatever he may do to himself spiritually or
otherwise. See supra notes 25, 33.
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function of our uniforms or guns, but rather was derived from
our position in a larger scheme of justice: if there is no justice
the police are merely an occupying army.
Several experiences that I have had since the verdict have
revealed its meaning, I think. Shortly after the verdict my
partner and I stopped a car driven by a black man. A group of
people came out of their houses to heckle us. A woman yelled,
"You're just mad because we won!"...
At the station yesterday, I overheard a black officer angrily tell a
white officer that even though O.J. had committed the murders,
"white America got what they deserved."
Despite working every day in the black community, I vastly
underestimated the racial divide. It seems clear to me now that
the verdict was an expression of deep resentment....
This letter records the dismay and then the self-examination displayed
by many whites in this country upon confronting what was for them
the stunning verdict in the Simpson criminal case.4°
40. My Northern California police officer friend, Harry S. Stern, supplied me on
February 11, 1997 with the following comment on the 1997 verdict in the Simpson
civil trial:
The end of the criminal trial [in October 1995] was preceded by a big buildup.
That verdict was intentionally announced the morning after it had been reached
in order to give the police and others time to prepare. The public knew what
time it would be read and thus could tune in at the appropriate time. My
narcotics unit was placed on alert. We were to wear regular blue uniforms, have
our helmets with us, and we were divided into squads.
The conclusion of the civil trial was not as climactic. There was no
anticipation of unrest. The verdict was read shortly after it had been reached.
My wife and I watched the reading of the verdicts on television. A friend called
from Chicago and told me that a local station had information that there had
been a defense verdict. This was upsetting news. I had never doubted that
Simpson had stabbed Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown to death. There was no
other explanation for their brutal deaths. So I was relieved when the rumors
proved false; the jury had determined that Simpson was the killer.
The black people that I spoke with about the civil trial seemed resigned
rather than angry. My sense is that, despite the results of so many polls and
surveys, the belief by blacks in Simpson's innocence was not deeply held.
Rather, blacks chose to support Simpson from what they deemed an attack
from white institutions.
Thus, my view as a police officer is that the civil verdict was not a
vindication of the justice system. The civil trial was in essence a dispute
between private parties. The Goldman and Brown family brought their own
cases against the man that they believed had killed their relatives.
In the criminal trial the most often repeated description of the police (and
hence by association, the District Attorney and the State of California) was
that they were "racist" and "bungling." From my perspective these enduring
assessments represented the criminal defense's complete success in replacing
Mr. Simpson with the police as the defendants. The police were put on trial,
not O.J. Simpson.
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VII.
There are, I have suggested, truths about legal controversies that do
not depend upon what a jury happens to say. We need, in assessing
such matters, a sense of what is knowable and of how it is to be
known. Some have argued that the Simpson trial dramatizes defects in
our criminal-law system. No doubt, various aspects of jury selection,
trial management, and attorney conduct can be improved. But what
we have seen in Los Angeles since June 1994 is much more an
indictment of our popular culture than of our legal system. Our
criminal-law system works fairly well, usually, making it highly
unlikely that those now found in prison did not do either what they
were charged with or something very much like it. (This does not rule
out the practice sometimes resorted to by police, and not impossible in
the Simpson case, of enhancing or perhaps even creating evidence to
reinforce the case the authorities are certain of already.41)
What does not work very well is how we treat both those who are
more likely to become criminals and those who have been identified as
criminals. Something is dreadfully wrong, for which we shall all have
to suffer for decades to come, when there is (as now) large-scale
chronic unemployment in our inner cities (a decade-long depression)
and when there are so many African-American young men (one-third,
it is said) who are enmeshed by the criminal-law system, numbers that
have been rising steadily.
The effects of this strategy, not unique to the Simpson case, are far-reaching
and quite disastrous, I believe. A criminal trial is not merely a clinical inquiry;
it has the potential to offer a moral lesson for both the accused (who must
come to terms with his actions if responsible) and the community at large.
Although I did not follow the civil trial closely, I gathered that the plaintiffs
prevailed, in part, because of their ability to distance themselves from the
institutions that Simpson's criminal defense team had done so much to
discredit. As I stated, the plaintiffs were private parties seeking a private
remedy. Furthermore, in the civil arena the apparatus that places such a
premium on ferreting out alleged police misconduct, the exclusionary rule, is
not present. Accordingly, the civil defense could not delve into the
"conspiracy theory" to the extent that their criminal counterparts had.
It seems to me, then, that for black people much less was at stake in the civil
trial; they did not feel the same animosity toward the Goldman and Brown
families that they felt toward the police. And in turn, the civil verdict did little
or nothing to restore the reputation of California law enforcement.
Both of Mr. Stern's letters are printed in this Article with his permission. On the
exclusionary rule, see George Anastaplo, Constitutional Comment, in GERA-LIND
KOLARIK, FREED TO KILL: THE TRUE STORY OF LARRY EYLER 367 (1990). See also Akhil
Reed Amar, A Second Chance at Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A21.
41. See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Maybe O.J. Did It and The Cops Tried to Frame Him, Too,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1997, § 2, at 1.
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A social system in which these appallingly wasteful things become
routine is deeply flawed. The responsibility for this state of affairs
rests with all of us. This is not to deny that the way all too many of
these young men, and their own people, respond to their deprivations
can make matters worse, including for themselves. (We have long
seen this kind of desperation in Sicily, where violent crime sometimes
seems a "natural" way of life.) Nor is it to deny that the young
criminal must be firmly dealt with, for his own good as well as for the
good of the community, when he steps out of line. But that is only the
beginning of a challenge that is ignored by those who believe that our
salvation lies in building more and more prisons (corrupting though
they may be) and then throwing their keys away after they are filled
up.
I argued, in my June 1994 talk on the Simpson case, "Particularly
harmful is the teaching, all too common among us these days, that it is
fitting and proper to evade having to face up to what one has done.' 42
This teaching applies not only to desperate defendants and their single-
minded lawyers. It applies even more to the community at large,
which sometimes seems blithely unaware of what it is doing to cripple,
enrage, and otherwise damage so many of its youth. I have long
believed that one useful place to begin, in an effort to remedy things in
this country, would be with a massive public-works project, along
with the funding of first-rate schools and intensive job training, for our
inner cities.43 After all, we were willing to undertake and sustain for a
decade such a humane and morale-repairing experiment on an even
larger scale, sixty years ago, when the Great Depression-unlike the
persistent depression in our inner cities today-was colorblind.
42. Anastaplo, On Crime, supra note 7, at 469.
43. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, What Is Still Wrong With George Anastaplo? A
Sequel to 366 U.S. 82 (1961), 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 551, 627 (1986); ANASTAPLO, THE
AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at 454. The Simpson case can be expected to remain
a substantial "public-works project" for lawyers and journalists, with considerable
litigation and many revelations yet to come.
The criminal case prompted many to say that Simpson was acquitted because
he is wealthy .... Simpson's money gave him the best lawyers and the best
possible chance. This is nothing new, but we hope the Simpson trials will
prompt public discussion of the quality of legal representation available to the
poor.
Editorial, Important Lessons from Simpson Circus, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at 37.
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APPENDIX A
THE FATE OF THE JEWS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR'
Do listen to what happened to me, so that you may see that I
would not yield even to one man against the just [course of
action] because of a fear of death, even if I were to perish by
refusing to yield .... I, men of Athens, never held any office in
the city except for being once on the Council. And it happened
that our tribe, Antiochis, held the prytany when you wished to
judge the ten generals (the ones who did not pick up the men
from the naval battle) as a group-unlawfully, as it seemed to all
of you in the time afterwards. I alone of the prytanes opposed
your doing anything against the laws then, and I voted against it.
And although the orators were'ready to indict me and arrest me,
and you were ordering and shouting, I supposed that I should
run the risk with the law and the just rather than side with you
because of fear of prison or death when you were counseling
unjust things.
Now this was when the city was still under the democracy. But
again, when the oligarchy came to be, the Thirty [Tyrants]
summoned five of us into the Tholos, and they ordered us to
arrest Leon the Salaminian and bring him from Salamis to die.
They ordered many others to do many things of this sort,
wishing that as many as possible would be implicated in the
responsibility. Then, however, I showed again, not in speech but
in deed, that I do not even care about death in any way at all-if
it is not too crude to say so-but that my whole care is to
commit no unjust or impious deed. That government, as strong
as it was, did not shock me into doing anything unjust. When
we came out of the Tholos, the other four went to Salamis and
arrested Leon, but I departed and went home. And perhaps I
would have died because of this, if that government had not
been quickly overthrown.
-Socrates 45
44. This talk was prepared for a Chicago Conference on the Holocaust in Southern
Europe, sponsored by the National Italian-American Foundation, October 7, 1994. Its
original title was The Fate of the Jews in Greece and Italy During the Second World War.
On the case for supporting Israel, see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note
4, at 155-59. An earlier version of this 1994 talk (to which Theodora Vasils and Themi
Vasils contributed) has been published in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, CAMPUS HATE-SPEECH
CODES AND TWENTIETH CENTURY ATROCITIES 49 (1997).
45. PLATO, The Apology of Socrates 32A-E, in FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES (Thomas G.
West & Grace Starry West trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1984).
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I.
The fate of the Jews in Southern Europe during the Second World
War differed from country to country-and, indeed, as in Greece,
their fate could differ from one region to another in the same country.
One constant factor everywhere in Occupied Europe was the insane
determination of the Nazi savages to slaughter all the Jews that they
could get their hands on.46 How much murdering the Nazis could do
depended, primarily, on the circumstances of the Jews in a particular
place and on the degree of cooperation that the Nazis were able to get
from the local population in their merciless campaigns against the
Jews.
47
The Greeks, by and large, did not collaborate with the Germans
during the Second World War-and for this they suffered
grievously.48 The German army was never welcome in Greece. Nor,
of course, had the Italian army, which invaded Greece in October
1940, been welcome-but the Italians (whose hearts were not in that
invasion) could be repelled by the Greeks, at least until the Germans
came to the rescue of their humiliated ally. Greece could not do much
(even with some help from the British) to withstand the massive
German attack-but it, after having been obliged to surrender to the
Germans in April 1941, could maintain significant Resistance efforts
throughout the long and brutal German and Bulgarian Occupation that
followed.
The most vulnerable Jews in Greece were always those in Salonika,
"the Jerusalem of the Balkans" and the most eminent Sephardic
settlement in Europe, where Jews had lived in large numbers since
their expulsion from Spain in 1492. More than 55,000 Jews lived in
the German zone of occupation, which included Salonika, with its
closely-knit and highly conspicuous community of 53,000 Jews, or
more than two-thirds of the Jews in Greece.49 It proved to be a fairly
simple matter for the Germans, in early 1943, to trap the Jews in
Salonika for shipment to their death camps in Eastern Europe,
particularly Auschwitz. The Germans did not need, for this deadly
46. See Anastaplo, On Trial, supra note 2, at 992. See also infra note 50.
47. On both the antecedents and the atrocities of the Nazis in Europe, see ARNO J.
MAYER, WHY DID THE HEAVENS NOT DARKEN? THE "FINAL SOLUTION" IN HISTORY (1988).
48. See the article on modern Greece, to which I contributed, in 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 178-204 (15th ed. 1993). See also supra notes 36, 37.
49. It has also been estimated that when Greece was overrun in 1941, between 5,000
and 6,000 Jews lived in the Bulgarian zone of occupation and about 13,000 lived in the
Italian zone of occupation. See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS
442 (1961).
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operation, the cooperation of the Greeks, however much the worst
elements among the Greeks (as elsewhere) were available for the most
horrible deeds. What the Germans did need in Salonika, as was often
the case elsewhere, was the ignorance among Jews as to what fate was
intended for them, an ignorance made possible in large part by the very
enormity of the evil that had been planned by the Nazis °
The safest places in Greece for Jews, or for other Greeks hunted by
the Germans, were probably in those mountainous areas of the country
that were controlled somewhat by the Greek Resistance. The next
safest places for Jews and others were in the parts of Greece occupied
by the Italian army. (This was true also in the parts of France and
Croatia occupied by the Italians.") The Greeks, however much they
resented the unjustified Italian invasion of their country in 1940,
recognized that the Italian zone of occupation was administered far
more compassionately than either the Bulgarian zone or the German
zone, so much so that the Germans came to have "serious doubts of
the 'sincerity of implementation' [of German anti-Jewish measures] on
the part of the Italians. ' 52 Yet even here there were anomalies. For
example, the Bulgarian government which cooperated so readily with
the Germans in hunting down Jews in Greece was reluctant to deliver
the Jews in Bulgaria to the Nazis. Similarly, in Vichy France, the
French collaborationist government was, at least for awhile, far more
protective of French Jews than it was of foreign Jews living in France.
Outside of Salonika, the Jews of Greece were much more difficult
to identify-and the Christian Greeks were not eager to be of help to
the Germans there. Not that most Greeks were especially concerned
about the fate of their Jews. What was done on behalf of those Jews
seems to have been a part of what was done by Greeks generally to
resist and frustrate the foreign tyrants who had imposed their will upon
their country. I have been told that the level of anti-Semitism (that is,
hatred of Jews) has always been low in Greece. (While I was
growing up in St. Louis and in Southern Illinois in the 1930s, I heard
50. On the comprehensive madness and hence, "unbelievability" of that evil, see
Anastaplo, On Trial, supra note 2, at 977-94. The occasional "Holocaust-denier," even
though he is likely to hate Jews, testifies to the enormity of the evil done to the Jews by
his refusal to face up to the evidence of what his kind of hatred can lead to. See infra note
52.
51. See, e.g., LEON POLIAKOV & JACQUES SABILLE, JEWS UNDER THE ITALIAN
OCCUPATION 160 (Howard Fertig Inc. 1983) (1955).
52. HILBERG, supra note 49, at 448. The German use here of sincerity is curious,
reflecting as it does (in however perverted circumstances) the possible grounding of the
moral virtues in nature. See Anastaplo, Teaching, Nature, and the Moral Virtues, supra
note 26, Part 1II. See also supra note 50.
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Turks occasionally disparaged by my Greek immigrant parents, but
never the Jews.) Jewish officers were known to have distinguished
themselves in the gallant defense of Greece in 1940-1941 and
thereafter in the Resistance; this made it difficult for the Germans and
their collaborators to portray the Jews in Greece in the way they were
portrayed elsewhere-as bourgeois, exploitive, cosmopolitan, and
hence unpatriotic. Thus, in Greece, the Jews outside of Salonika had
far more to fear from desperate Jewish leaders who were driven to
cooperate with the Germans (as happened all too often in other
countries as well) than they had to fear either from the Greeks or from
many of the Italian occupiers in Greece. Perhaps it was inevitable,
considering how much the sense of community has always meant to
Jews, that too many of their unreliable leaders would be trusted by
Jews in the countries occupied by the Germans.53
II.
It should not be surprising that the spirited Greeks would not
cooperate with their German occupiers in any enterprise that the
Germans set their hearts on. What is remarkable is the effective
opposition by the fairly easygoing Italians to various German
initiatives (not least against the Jews) in Greece, France, Croatia, and
Italy. Again and again, Italian diplomats, military officers, and even
some Fascist bureaucrats (as well as the common soldier and the
population at large) refused to help the Germans do the terrible things
that they tried to do. One consequence of this was that eighty percent
of the fifty thousand Italian Jews survived the war. The survival rate
of the Italian Jews would probably have been lower, however, if the
German occupation of Italy had lasted as long as did the German
occupation of Greece, where (largely because of the deadly Salonika
trap) no more than twenty percent of the Greek Jews survived. It
seems that perhaps half of the more then twenty thousand Jews in
Greece outside of Salonika survived the war.
It certainly helped the cause of humanity in Italy that there were in
that country no concentrations of distinctive-looking and foreign-
sounding Jews such as there were in Salonika and Janina.5 4 To
outsiders such as the Germans, the Jews of Italy were not obviously
53. See, for example, Rachel Dalven, The Holocaust in Janina, in 2 J. OF MOD. GREEK
STUD. 87 (1984). On the Nazi manipulation of Jewish "leadership," see ISAIAH TRUNK,
JUDENRAT: THE JEWISH COUNCILS IN EASTERN EUROPE UNDER NAZI OCCUPATION (1972).
54. Also distinctive-looking, and hence vulnerable all over Europe, were the
Gypsies, the forgotten victims of the Nazis. See Anastaplo, Lessons for the Student of
Law, supra note 17, at 159-60.
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distinguishable from other Italians. By the time the Germans occupied
Italy (after the post-Mussolini government surrendered to the Allies in
the Fall of 1943), most Italians were so opposed to the war that the
Germans could not expect any reliable help from them. In fact, after
September 1943 the Germans treated the Italians as another conquered
people, even going so far as to gun down Italian troops who resisted
them. About 640,000 Italian officers and men spent part of the war in
German prison camps, where 30,000 of them died." However
blameworthy Italy may be for having helped make the Second World
War possible, that country never threw itself anywhere into the racial
programs of the Nazis. For one thing, a virulent anti-Semitism has
never had deep roots in Italy, where there has been a substantial
Jewish presence since Roman times (that is, even before Christianity
came to Italy). However questionable official Vatican policies with
respect to the Jews may have seemed to be at times during the war,
many Italians (including priests, monks, and nuns) provided refuges
and other help for Jews sought by the Nazis, often at the risk of their
own lives. All this is not to deny, of course, that there were some
Italians, just as there were some Greeks, who did things in
collaboration with the Nazis that should not have been done by anyone
anywhere.
What does seem to have deep roots among Italians is a sense of
humanity-and the beneficiaries of this, during the Second World
War, included (as I have said) the Jews, the Greeks, the French, and
the Croatians. In fact, it can be added, the mainland Italians may be by
and large the gentlest people in Europe today. This is reflected in how
they treat their children. This is also reflected in the fact that most
Italian Jews decided after the war "to remain in Italy rather than
emigrate to Israel or the United States, as most German and Eastern
European Jews did. ' '5 6 Certainly, the Italians are the gentlest of the
peoples that ring the Mediterranean. How they got to be this way can
be debated. (Machiavelli, long ago, singled out the influence of the
Roman Catholic Church in these matters.) Another question is
whether such gentleness is always in the service of the common good:
a determined toughness may sometimes be called for. (Here, too,
Machiavelli can be instructive. This is related to Mussolini's effort to
harden the Italian character by exposure to wars.) Too much, or the
wrong kind, of gentleness can lead to intolerable conditions which
open the way to a Strong Man who promises deliverance but who is
55. See SUSAN ZUCO'ITi, THE ITALIANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 7 (1987).
56. ALEXANDER STILLE, BENEVOLENCE AND BETRAYAL: FIVE ITALIAN JEWISH FAMILIES
UNDER FASCISM 13 (Summit Books 1991).
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much more likely to deliver oppression. On the other hand, if the
Greeks had more of the Italian gentleness, they probably would not
have subjected themselves to the cruel civil war that followed the
Second World War in Greece."
Thus, the Jews of Italy, like those of Denmark, owed their survival
in such large numbers to special circumstances, not the least of which
was the character of the peoples among whom they happened to be
living when the Nazis made their evil demands. One suspects that
Italian gentleness would not have sufficed in Denmark, where a highly
disciplined evacuation program had to be organized. One also
suspects that Danish honor would not have worked as well in Italy,
where geographical and social circumstances made an almost
instinctive "bending of the law" and passive resistance more
effective.58
III.
I have been asked to suggest on this occasion what we can do to
protect ourselves in the future from such systematic atrocities as the
Nazis inflicted upon the world a half century ago. I suspect that the
term protect can lead us astray here. Protection tends to emphasize
anticipating the sorts of things that the Nazis did and then setting up
barriers against them. We are tempted to adopt this defensive
approach when we recall that critical to the devastation that the Nazis
wrought was the fact that few (if any) Europeans expected the
Germans to do, so systematically and on so large a scale, the barbaric
things which they certainly did. So despicable were the horrible things
ordered by the Nazis that they usually did not dare admit even to their
own people what they were doing. (It may be destined to remain a
mystery how many Germans knew what and when. What is not a
mystery is why so few Germans ever wanted to be publicly
recognized, even while still in power, as personally responsible for the
Nazi atrocities. Is there not something reassuringly natural about this?
Also somewhat natural, unfortunately, is that so many Germans did
not want to face up to what they must have sensed their government
was doing.)
57. On the Greek civil war and its aftermath (the 1967-1974 rule of the Colonels), see
supra notes 36, 37, 48 and accompanying text.
58. On civil disobedience, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at
537-54. For extended accounts of the slaughter of the Jews during the Second World
War, see GERALD REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE ATTEMPT TO EXTERMINATE THE
JEWS OF EUROPE 1939-1945 (2d rev. and augm. ed. 1968); Lucy S. DAWIDOWIcz, THE
WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945 (1st ed., Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1975).
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No doubt, something is to be said for a useful wariness, including
an awareness of the monstrous things that human beings can indeed do
to one another. But wariness should not be permitted to deteriorate
either into paranoia or (because of exhaustion) into passivity, both of
which can have corrosive effects by constantly exposing one's
imagination to horrors. One should be cautious, that is, about either
expecting or dwelling upon the worst, generation after generation.
This can be routinely crippling, whereas the monstrous rarely appears.
In these matters, that is, constant apprehensiveness, a spirit of
surrender, and a sense of perpetual grievance all tend to become
obstacles to a proper maturation.
A far healthier approach here, and usually more truly practical, is to
encourage and equip the finest human beings among us. A morbid
preoccupation either with erecting barriers against the worst possible
eventuality or with feeling helpless in expectation of dreadful things
can keep the best souls from flourishing. The role of chance in such
matters is evident, even distressingly evident, to anyone familiar with
Holocaust stories. Being good, which includes having the capacity to
figure out and then to do whatever is called for, is probably the most
reliable protection in a variety of circumstances. One needs to be able
to identify accurately and to think sensibly about the unpredictable
challenges one happens to confront if one is to improvise effectively in
the extreme cases that do chance to arise. Such effectiveness depends
upon being guided in the face of the monstrous by a sense of decency
and upon being strengthened in the most dangerous situations by a
sense of honor. It should be emphasized that the proper response to
evil programs varies from place to place and from time to time.
Automatic responses in these matters are likely to be self-defeating. It
also helps, if one is to conduct oneself as one should in response to the
most terrible demands, to keep within reasonable limits that oppressive
"fear of prison or death" which Socrates warned against. The role
here of a sound education cannot be overestimated, however
discouraging the 1933-1945 experiences of the highly cultured
German people may have been.5
59. On the cultural foundations for the political sobriety of the English-speaking
peoples (to which Shakespeare has made a significant contribution), see GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY 1, 11, 13, 74-88 (1989). See
also ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 107. On
another argument for sobriety, see supra note 17 and the following letter-to-the-editor I
prepared in April 1997:
The orchestrated "suicides" of thirty-nine Heaven's Gate cult members in San
Diego remind us of the deadly folly that can result from bizarre delusions that
are not adequately challenged by the community at large. The form and
1997] 487
488 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 28
In any event, it is prudent to notice that the worst atrocities
organized in the 1940s by the Nazis were done under cover of war.
Therefore it is also prudent, especially at a time when military
technology and modern governments can be so devastating, for us to
be most reluctant to countenance recourse to war by anyone, however
much power it may be our duty to hold in reserve in order to be able to
intimidate the unruly. Men and women of good will should be
heartened somewhat, as well as instructed, upon contemplating and
even cherishing the salutary (however flawed) gentleness of the
remarkably good-natured Italian people. Also to be contemplated,
with both awe and gratitude, are the great Jewish people who have
contributed so much to civilizing the Western World, something that
resentful savages can never understand.6°
consequences of such fatal nonsense vary according to time and other
circumstances, depending in part upon the temperament and experiences of the
more susceptible among us.
The recklessness, if not cynicism, of those who concoct, peddle, and
promote dangerous delusions should be recognized. Also to be recognized, far
more than it sometimes seems to be, is the duty that sensible people have to
challenge and thereby to help discipline those who habitually talk nonsense
or who are peculiarly responsive to the nonsense they hear.
Those privileged to know something about what "evidence" means should
not shrink from being publicly "judgmental" when the occasion demands,
however careful they should be not to sound moralistic in their championing
of a sound morality. The Heaven's Gate debacle should be even more troubling
than it naturally is when it is recognized that there were probably some murder
victims (and hence at least a few murderers) among the thirty-nine "suicides"
in San Diego.
See, e.g., USA-TODAY, May 8, 1997, at 13-A.
60. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:1, 5-8; 1 Samuel 17: 1-51; Proverbs 29:18. On the
case for supporting Israel, see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at
155-59. On the power of gentleness, see a 1965 poem by Sara Prince Anastaplo
inspired by the sounds and sight of the goats, donkeys, and birds in and around Delphi,
Greece:
Delphi
Delphi is the sound of bells
Beaten copper, twisted thin
Folded nailed with copper pegs,
Brilliant sparks from metal shells
Struck by fur and skeleton
In rhythms moved by legs.
The mountain's thrust, the birds' wild wings
Scarce touch the air that bears their stress.
This world declares that gentleness
Is strength and bell-like sings.
For other poems by this poet, see ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 14, at
v, 139-40, 384. See also LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: THE PRACTICE OF THEORY 2, 1033 (John
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APPENDIX B
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 6
[I]t must be remembered that, during most
of the past two hundred years, the
Constitution as interpreted by [the United
States Supreme Court] did not prohibit the
most ingenious and pervasive forms of
discrimination against the Negro. Now
when a State acts to remedy the effects of
that legacy of discrimination, I cannot
believe that this same Constitution stands as
a barrier.
-Thurgood Marshall
62
I.
Does the United States Constitution-which is established to serve
the common good-sometimes undermine that common good, or at
least stand in the way of dedicated efforts to advance it? What is the
relation between what the Constitution says, or is taken to say, and the
enduring interests of the community? I hope you are patient as I return
to this question again and again on this occasion.
Consider, for example, how the First Amendment is read, that part
of the Constitution which provides that Congress shall make no law
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Would it be
consistent with such a provision to regulate publication of pre-election
opinion polls? If your answer is that the First Amendment does not
permit restrictions upon the publication of such polls, does this mean
that the Constitution may keep us from doing what we believe is
sensible to be done in order to have proper election campaigns and a
healthy political life? (On the other hand, it can be argued that pre-
election polling minimizes the disruptive element of surprise in our
political system. But does this argument against regulation bear more
on the political than on the constitutional issues here?)
A. Murley, Robert L. Stone & William T. Braithwaite, eds., 1992).
61. This talk was given at the Calumet College of St. Joseph, Hammond, Indiana,
November 9, 1988. See also George Anastaplo, An Introduction to 'Ancient' African
Thought, in 1995 THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 146 (1995). For a useful survey of
affirmative-action issues, see RALPH A. RossuM, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE (1980). See also NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 157 (1988).
62. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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Take another case under the First Amendment. What if one
believes, as I have believed for many years, that broadcast television
has had an awful effect upon most Americans, that it has been
disastrous for political life in this country, and that for these and for
other reasons it should be completely abolished?63 Does the First
Amendment prohibit such abolition? If it does, do we have here
another instance of prudent policy suggesting one thing even as a
constitutional prohibition keeps our governments from pursuing that
policy?
Take still another case. There is an amendment, the Second, which
says that the people have the right "to keep and bear Arms." Suppose
one believes, as many of us believe, that there is something very
troubling about the American appetite for the personal arsenals we
have built up with which we kill ourselves at a very high rate,
probably at a higher rate than any other people in the world, except
where there are civil wars going on. Is it true that the Second
Amendment prohibits severe legal restrictions upon the purchase or
possession of personal firearms-and if it does, is not this another
instance in which the Constitution says one thing and a sensible policy
says something quite different? (In this case, as in the others, there
might be an argument as to what a sensible policy would truly be,
aside from the issue of whether the Constitution really does prohibit
public control of the private ownership and use of guns.)
We have been noticing legal measures desired for public policy
purposes-for the good of the community, salutary measures that are
sincerely believed by some to be prohibited by the Constitution. Of
course, we must also recognize the possibility that there may be
measures devised that would be constitutional and yet wrongheaded, if
not even unjust and "counterproductive."
That is, it should be emphasized both that a measure is not
unconstitutional simply because it is unjust and foolish, and that a
measure is not just and sensible simply because it is constitutional.
For example, a legislature can pass a tax bill which wrecks an
economy, but there may not be anything unconstitutional about it. It
may be the height of folly; it may even be unjust in many ways; but
there need not be an issue raised thereby of its constitutionality. We
see, therefore, that there can be a difference between what some people
63. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 2, at 245-316. On freedom
of speech and the First Amendment, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST:
NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1971); ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 47.
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may consider good or bad policy and what the same people consider
constitutional or unconstitutional.
II.
I should now like to consider at greater length a particular
constitutional issue, or set of issues, made even more acute by the
Presidential election results yesterday.64 We now have a national
administration returned to office which is generally regarded by a
sizable racial minority in this country as unresponsive, if not even
hostile, to their interests. Whether that minority, which is not
represented in my audience on this occasion, is correct in regarding the
administration in this way can no doubt be debated. It is wondered, in
any event, what the United States Supreme Court will do with race-
related issues as members are added to it by a "conservative" President
during the next few years. How will this affect what the Supreme
Court permits various American governments, state and national, to do
with respect to race relations in the 1990s?65
It is essential to notice, at the outset of our discussion, that
considerable progress has been made in American race relations since
the Second World War. It is foolish and even dangerous to deny that
such progress has been made, so obvious is it to the well-informed. If
one denies that progress has been made, is not one denying in effect
that there are any standards by which progress can be measured?
Although considerable progress has been made since the Second
World War, chronic problems remain, as testified to by the massive
unemployment and underemployment in our inner cities. Those
afflictions are most dramatic among one racial group. The serious
disturbances in our cities include the crime rate, the prevalence of
drugs, the rate of illegitimacy, the deterioration of families as well as
of the city itself, and a general demoralization. It is no wonder, then,
that parts of our cities have become unsafe both for the people who
live there and for anybody who comes into them from the outside.
(The "outside" may be only a few blocks away in some instances.)
Not only are large residential parts of our cities, as well as many
commercial areas, effectively closed off to the majority much of the
64. The election referred to was on November 8, 1988, the day before this talk was
given in Hammond, Indiana. Critical to all talks of this kind are the circumstances in
which they are given. An awareness of circumstances can, if one is responsible, very
much affect the emphasis that should be given to various points. Or, as Socrates noticed
in Plato's Menexenus, it is easy to praise Athens to Athenians.
65. See Charlotte Saikowski, A Turn to the Right on Civil Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1988, at 19.
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time, but the productivity and general prosperity of the entire country
suffer as a result of the persistent misuse of resources evident in the
inner cities. Misuse may be seen in the fact that millions of people are
not gainfully employed but rather have to be supported by the
taxpayer-or have to be policed, imprisoned, or managed in other
ways.
Some of those who grow up in these depressed areas do manage to
rise out of them. We all know such people; we are heartened by them.
But what about the bulk of their neighbors? What is needed from the
community at large-in the training and advancement of depressed
racial minorities-if they are to be brought much more into the life of
the national community (and economy) than they now are? It becomes
a pressing question of public policy what the community can do to
bring them in-to make them much more productive, much happier,
much more useful for everybody, much less dangerous or less
apparently dangerous, than they are now.
How should we begin to deal with and make use of such people?
How can we help prepare them to fit in and to work out? Consider
what happens when merit selection is used to choose among
candidates for specialized training, such as in a medical school or with
a police department or a fire department. Objective tests are often
relied upon. What is our use of such tests likely to mean in practice?
This is the sort of problem that has to be addressed here.
The use of objective tests means that the number of people selected
for advancement from depressed minorities in the inner cities, or
anywhere else in our country, is likely to be well below the proportion
of those minorities in the general population, except perhaps in the
field of athletics. It is realistic to notice that this discrepancy need not
be due to any bias in the preparation, administration, or grading of the
tests employed. Even if "cultural bias" and other kinds of bias should
be kept out of the testing and selection, there would still be significant
deficiencies in the ability of depressed minorities to do as well as most
other groups in the community. It is prudent to face up to the
problems here and to what, if anything, can be done about them.
If "equality of opportunity" is the standard to be employed, with no
preferences shown for any group, we should expect members of the
more depressed racial-minority groups not to achieve much compared
either to the general population or to various other groups. This is not
likely to change for some time. Although official discrimination
against minorities is now eliminated, at least as a matter of law, we can
expect the consequences of our former patterns of discrimination to be
with us for some time to come. If racial discrimination had not been
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believed to have enduring effects, it probably would not have been
taken as seriously as it was for decades by both its proponents and its
opponents.
That is, we suspect that the consequences of past official adverse
discrimination and of some, perhaps much, continuing unofficial
discrimination are pervasive, affecting family life, neighborhoods,
habits, opportunities, and expectations. If the various racial and other
groups among us are roughly equal by nature, one can anticipate
significant differences in consequences because of differences in the
way that racial minorities have been treated for years. Are not those
consequences likely to be enduring?
The point I want to stress here is that the removal of legal
discrimination and an insistence upon fair treatment now, in the form
of "equal opportunity," may not do much, at least for a long time, to
improve the lives of many among us who have been discriminated
against, or whose forebears were systematically discriminated against,
for a very long time. We have to consider, therefore, the tension
between the common good, on the one hand, and (as we shall see)
what is fair in particular cases, on the other hand. It may even be
suggested that the venerable principle of equality in certain of its
manifestations may have to be subordinated to the common good.
III.
Should deliberate special efforts be made to advance depressed
racial minorities in this country? Various immigrant groups in this
country have evidently been less fettered, less crippled, than these
racial minorities by their contacts with the dominant groups that have
run the country for centuries. Why should those immigrants have
been able to do so well so quickly? How much does a people's rate of
success in this country depend upon the achievements and conditions
of that people's forebears for centuries past in "the old country"? How
much does the rate of improvement depend upon former conditions in
this country, including the condition of servitude or the condition
thereafter of systematic hostility that found expression in a network of
oppressive legislation? How much do continuing disabilities depend
upon color differences, which make it relatively easy to identify
"them"? In various ways we can be again reminded of what long-term
shaping can mean to human beings.
I state the following proposition starkly in order that we may face up
to the race-relations issue as it sometimes presents itself to us today: to
make special efforts to raise up any minority that has been deprived for
a long time can mean, at least in the short run, that the community as a
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whole is likely to be deprived in some ways. For example, if special
efforts are made to admit minority candidates to a medical school,
some of the doctors developed thereby are likely to be inferior to those
who would have been admitted to that medical school in their places,
assuming that the overall mode of selection ordinarily used is a
sensible one.
Furthermore, if efforts are made to correct the long-term
consequences of centuries of racial exploitation and discrimination,
some individuals in the currently dominant group will not get what
they otherwise would have gotten which they have in a sense earned.
This may be seen, for example, when seniority is modified, with a
view to racial adjustments, in determining who gets laid off by a
company or by government. Such attempted correction of injustices or
of the effects of past injustices may not go smoothly, especially when
the individuals who are thereby denied what they would otherwise
have gotten are not themselves personally guilty of racial prejudice or
of discriminatory conduct.
Still, does not something have to be done if the community is not to
continue to suffer because of large minorities left in their inadequacies
and in their resentments? Doing something to correct these matters, it
is argued, may have to include significant preferential treatment of
those who are members of a group which has been systematically
deprived for years. This is where the issue begins to become highly
controversial for us. Such preferential treatment can include
affirmative action, quotas, reverse discrimination, and special services.
Some of that preferential treatment can be concealed; it can be provided
without acknowledging that it is being given. But one wonders how
long and how effectively that sort of thing can be hidden. Is it not
usually prudent, at least in such matters, to face up to what is being
done and why it is being done?
Is it not also prudent to face up to the fact that what is being done
may not work well, and may even have to be discarded for another
experiment? Certainly, it should be recognized that a number of such
efforts, which can be quite costly, may not do anybody much good-
and may even be harmful, especially if they should somehow or other
corrupt those who are given preferential treatment. And, we have
noticed, such experiments, even if properly explained, are likely to
disturb those people who consider themselves deliberately denied what
they would otherwise have gotten.
The anger to be expected here is bitter testimony to another fact: the
community is not united, it is not a true community. A close-knit
family, for example, is not likely to resent extra help for the crippled
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child among them, even if the child's disability should be considered
partly its own fault. The presence of uncharitable attitudes helps us
recognize that it is not a single community that is being dealt with in
these matters but rather an uneasy association of groups who do not
see themselves either as needing each other or as wanting to help those
most obviously in need of help, even for the good of all eventually.
IV.
The resentment aroused by resort to preferential remedies can no
doubt have political consequences. Those consequences may make it
difficult, if not impossible, for a government to institute or to persist in
a particular program. Suppose, however, that a community, acting
through its legislature, decides that a program of preferential treatment
is needed. There is then the problem of constitutional challenges with
which I began these remarks.
That is, what if that which is believed to be desirable for the
common good suggests one way of proceeding and that which the
Constitution says seems to keep the community from going the desired
way? Constitutional challenges here will, in most instances, probably
take the form of the objection that any kind of preferential treatment
(especially if race-related) is a denial of the equal protection of the laws
assured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The people who would
otherwise have gotten the medical school admissions, the jobs on the
police force, or whatever else we are talking about, can be expected to
protest, with some force, that they have been denied equal protection
of the laws.
The question then becomes what "equal protection of the laws"
means. What can be discerned from the language and known
circumstances of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified just after the
Civil War, which provides guidance here? Equal protection cannot
mean that everyone must be treated the same without regard to
circumstances. Few would deny that a legislature has to be able to
notice different conditions, or to notice some distinctions as compared
to other distinctions, which permit it to provide different things for
different people. Furthermore, is not the primary intention of the
Equal Protection Clause to keep the dominant group in the community
from systematically denying the benefit of law, or of the social-
economic system itself, to a minority, especially to any racial minority,
in its midst? Is not that what the Clause is mostly about-to keep an
entrenched majority from singling out politically-helpless minorities
for deprivations and burdens? Is not that what an investigation of the
development of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests? One is naturally
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led, therefore, to this question: Does the Equal Protection Clause
apply to situations in which a dominant group has deprived itself for
the sake of a minority with a view to improving thereby the community
as a whole? In these circumstances, the majority, which is in charge
of its self-deprivation, can always reclaim what it is denying itself.
But how about the individual member of the majority group who
believes himself to be suffering personally from what the majority is
doing both for the sake of the minority and for the sake of the
community as a whole? Is he being deprived of an equal-protection
right? Does he become thereby a member of an ill-treated minority?
Or should he be told, when he invokes what he is entitled to, that he
would benefit from the same law if he (or his forebears in this country)
had also endured and been crippled by certain demoralizing
experiences and certain systematic deprivations?
V.
What does "entitled" mean in these circumstances? When someone
says that he is due something on the basis of test scores or seniority or
other such criteria, what does that mean? Do not most entitlements
depend in large part upon the conditions, including the public policy,
laid down in the laws of the country? If an affirmative-action program
is properly developed and explained-this is far easier said than
done-all should be able to feel that everyone can eventually benefit
substantially from what is happening even though the immediate
beneficiaries are intended to be the members of the minority which is
specially helped in some way.
There is one other thing that should be noticed here. The provision
in the Fourteenth Amendment that equal protection should not be
denied to any person applies to the States. There is in the Constitution
no such provision with respect to the National Government. This
reminds us of the fact that slavery, which remains critical to the
background of the race-relations problem in this country, was
primarily a State-protected, if not even State-sponsored, institution.
Consequently, only the States were addressed by the Fourteenth
Amendment after the War which had destroyed slavery. It is rarely
noticed by those who talk about these matters that the Government of
the United States is not explicitly governed by any general equal
protection prohibition in the Constitution. Since the United States is
less likely than particular States to be controlled by entrenched
groups,66 the National Government does not need to have this
66. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10. On American federalism, see ANASTAPLO, THE
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constitutional restraint placed upon it, or so the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment evidently believed. Perhaps they also believed
that the power to "discriminate" must be left somewhere in the system,
prudently providing thereby for extreme cases.
VI.
I recapitulate: The key question in considering the problem of race
relations in this country may be whether the constitutional issues are as
important here as many have believed. Far more important than
constitutional provisions may be the moral sensibilities and the political
judgment of the community. It is vital that the community be able to
think things through and to face up to what its alternatives, as well as
its disabilities, truly are. Both majorities and minorities can have
severe disabilities. The disabilities of racial minorities among us are
obvious. The disabilities of majorities are less obvious, particularly
those disabilities which are in effect sustained by mistaken (if not even
Pollyannish) opinions about the nature of race relations and about what
might be done to improve them.
Constitutional issues are rooted ultimately in questions of right and
wrong, including the sense of the rightness of respecting a properly-
ordained constitution. The Constitution of 1787 itself is grounded in
the Common Law and in what used to be called natural right, that
system of permanent moral standards which we all rely upon, almost
instinctively at times. We need, for the proper handling of issues,
sensible moral and political discourse, not merely the sloganeering and
"power plays" we have become accustomed to in our public life. I
suggest that we should first determine what the right and proper things
to do are, not only with respect to race relations but also with respect
to any serious issue that we encounter. Once we have determined
what the proper and right things to do are, we should usually be able
to find constitutional ways of doing them.
It is important to add, before I leave this inquiry for the time being,
that I do not see why the United States should not have, in confronting
race-relations difficulties and other such problems, the flexibility and
resources that other large and civilized countries in the Western World
have. Or is there some principle (appreciated only by us) that should
keep the United States from having recourse to what other respectable
countries consider to be sensible and decent measures with respect to
these matters?6
7
CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 63, at 171-201.
67. On affirmative action, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
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VII.
It is also important to add, if only in passing on this occasion, that
the key measures that should be considered by the community in
dealing with most constitutional issues that are apt to arouse public
passions should probably be primarily legislative rather than judicial.
Measures that have to go through a legislature are more likely to be
examined and explained in a way that most people can grasp and are
more likely to be accommodated to. (Our experience with the abortion
controversy is instructive here.)
Is it not prudent to believe, in any event, that the United States
Constitution does not absolutely forbid local governments, as well as
the nation as a whole, to experiment in a responsible way with the
sensible and decent measures (including affirmative-action programs)
that seem somewhat likely among us to help establish justice and to
help insure domestic tranquillity?
APPENDIX C
THE FUTURE OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES68
When David offered himself to Saul to fight
Goliath the Philistine challenger, Saul, in
order to give him courage, armed him with
his own arms, which as soon as David had
them, he rejected, saying that he could not
be of as good worth with them as by
himself, and that he therefore wished to
find the enemy with his sling and with his
knife.
-Niccol6 Machiavelli 69
I.
I have been asked, by students in this class, for my opinion about
what is likely to happen to race relations in the United States. Those
prospects are relevant to this course, so much of which is devoted to
the race-conscious Fourteenth Amendment cases in the United States
Supreme Court.
supra note 3, at 18 If, 236. See also supra note 4.
68. This Lincoln's Birthday talk was given in a Constitutional Law course, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, Chicago, Illinois, February 12, 1997.
69. NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. 13 (Leo Paul S. de Alvarez trans.,
Waveland Press, 1989). See also I Samuel 17: 38-40, 45-47.
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This inquiry has been inspired by the verdict last week in the O.J.
Simpson civil trial and the quite different responses along racial lines
in the country at large both to that verdict and to the 1995 acquittal in
Mr. Simpson's criminal trial.70 We are reminded thereby that many, if
not most, African-Americans have long found it hard to believe that
our law-enforcement authorities can be relied upon to be fair to them.
The videotaped savaging of Rodney King, by Los Angeles police in
1991, dramatized what is implied by the sobering fact that one-third of
African-American males under thirty are entangled with the criminal-
law system. The framers of the capital-punishment resolution passed
last week by the American Bar Association House of Delegates, calling
for a moratorium on official executions in this country, are disturbed
by, among other things, apparent racial discrimination in how death
sentences are allocated.
This is not to deny that there has been, since the Second World
War, considerable progress in American race relations, as well as in
the status worldwide of women (whatever natural differences remain
to be sorted out). Consider, for example, the implications of these
entries buried in a "Headline History" for 1989:
Kristin M. Baker is the first female to become First Captain of
the West Point Corps of Cadets (Aug. 8), Army Gen. Colin L.
Powell is the first black to become Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Aug. 9), . . . L. Douglas Wilder, Democrat, is elected as
first black governor of Virginia (Nov. 7), New York City elects
David N. Dinkins, Democrat, its first black mayor (Nov. 7) ...
71
Indeed, far more progress has been made in race relations in this
country than seemed possible to me when I first observed, during my
wartime Air Corps career, how determined and thoroughgoing
segregation was in the Deep South a half-century ago. To refuse to
acknowledge the obvious progress there has been in recent decades is
to say, in effect, that there are no standards by which such matters may
be judged. If there really are no standards, then there is neither
anything to be done nor, strange to say, anything to worry about.
The emergence of a substantial African-American middle class has
been significant in recent decades, whatever the effects have been of
the consequent stripping from inner-city neighborhoods of their natural
leaders. But even the more successful of that middle class seem to
70. The verdict in the civil trial was announced February 4, 1997. See supra note I.
7 1. THE 1991 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 127 (Houghton Mifflin 1991). Compare
Don Pierson, Black Coaches Want Answers on NFL Hiring, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1997, §
3, at 13.
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find it difficult to shake off their sense of vulnerability as members of a
race that has endured centuries of systematic abuse.
Whatever progress there has been, even more toleration of (if not
also a genuine concern for) minorities needs to be developed among
the still-powerful majority in this country. The state of public opinion
(which has become more civilized with respect to these matters) can be
vital here, something that the law can help shape and maintain, just as
the law should be used to try to curb tyranny, exploitation, and simple
cruelty.
In short, the opinions of the majority in a republic such as ours
always need to be challenged, corrected, and ennobled by informed
and responsible citizens. Appeals to self-interest can be useful here.
The merits and conditions of domestic tranquillity should be explained
to white Americans. In addition, they should be counseled to help
establish now the norms in race relations that they want their great-
grandchildren to be protected by if they should become a minority in
this country in the twenty-first century.
72
II.
More critical than desirable changes either in "the system" or in the
opinions and conduct of the majority may be what African-Americans
do for themselves in taking advantage of the opportunities that happen
to be available to them, however inferior those opportunities all too
often remain. (For example, the substantial differences, from one
neighborhood to another in the public schools within one state after
another, remain a scandal.) African-Americans need to be able to take
more control of their lives, however limited anyone's control is
ultimately bound to be. This includes, perhaps must even begin with,
controlling what is routinely done among African-Americans to
themselves. This point is not unrelated to why Africans were
vulnerable to enslavement in the first place: they were not equipped to
defend themselves properly against the ever more greedy and ruthless
white men who preyed upon them century after century, leaving
everyone involved worse than they were when Africans and
72. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 156 (Thomas Perkins
Abernathey ed., Harper & Row 1964), Query XVIII :
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice
cannot sleep forever [with respect to slavery]: that considering numbers,
nature and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an
exchange of situation is among possible events: that it may become probable
by supernatural interference!
See also the letter by John Van Doren quoted in the Epilogue to this Article.
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Europeans first encountered each other. Victimization is rarely good
either for the victim or for the victimizer.13
African-Americans need to equip themselves to maximize talents and
to minimize liabilities. For this, education is critical-both the
instruction provided by schools and the guidance coming from
churches. Education helps one to be flexible, making more likely the
nurturing of that prudence which permits one to exploit opportunities
and to adapt to circumstances. African-American youngsters face here
the obstacles faced by youngsters generally in this country. Most
students today do far less with their educational resources and
opportunities than their grandparents did. One adverse influence here,
especially among the poor, is the unrelenting television industry.
Related to this massive adverse influence, perhaps most devastating
these days among African-Americans, are the delusions that have been
fostered about the opportunities for advancement offered to the young
by the sports and entertainment industries. However remarkable the
best practitioners may be in such pursuits, it does not make sense for
youngsters to be diverted from the sound guidance that a proper
education can provide for decent and productive lives.
It is worth noting here, too, the progress in race relations that there
has been, whatever the dubious features of our turning African-
Americans into our professional gladiators. The very best among
African-American entertainers and athletes in my lifetime may be two
men I have been fortunate to be able to watch up close for hours at a
time: Louis Armstrong and Michael Jordan. (Michael Jordan seems to
be genuinely respected here and abroad, in a way that not even Louis
Armstrong was at his peak.) I recall a long evening that an electrifying
Louis Armstrong performed at the officers' club on our air base,
toward the end of the Second World War. I also recall that, however
accomplished he obviously was on that occasion, I could hear some of
my fellow-officers (after a few drinks) muttering racial slurs, slurs that
one is not likely to have to deal with in similar circumstances today.
(Michael Jordan I was able to appreciate even in the "insane" venue of
Chicago Stadium.)
III.
The Jewish people provide, with respect to the primacy of education
in the modern world, a model for African-Americans to take to heart.
No other people, at least in the Western World, have been subjected to
73. See Anastaplo, An Introduction to 'Ancient' African Thought, supra note 61, at
159, 174 n.5. See also id. at 170 n.37 (on Joseph Conrad's HEART OF DARKNESS).
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the systematic savagery on a large scale that the Jews have endured in
this century, with at least two-thirds of their total numbers in Europe
deliberately slaughtered in one decade. The trauma of that fiendish
assault will take many decades, if not centuries, to cure. (The same
can be said about such devastation as that wrought by Pol Pot in
Cambodia.) Even so, there has been a remarkable recovery by Jews
worldwide during the past half-century. That ancient people has
drawn effectively upon a way of life grounded in a Book, a way which
has always made much of the family, law-abidingness, education, and
life itself.
74
If education is to have its salutary effects among African-Americans,
opportunities must be taken advantage of by them, including special
services that are provided by governments. Sensible affirmative-action
programs (whatever they are called) may still be needed, especially
programs that are properly explained and carefully monitored. Such
programs, it should be emphasized, can be for the good of the whole,
not just for the benefit of the minority that happens to be immediately
ministered to. This is like insisting upon rigorous public health
measures for all members of a city, with inoculations, medication, and
therapy subsidized for those who cannot afford them-and all this
with a view to heading off or dealing with deadly epidemics, festering
particularly among the underprivileged, which threaten everyone.
However much education is extolled, it is still prudent to keep in
mind what did happen, sixty years ago in Germany, to the most
educated Jews in the modern world living among the most cultured
people of their time. Had those "assimilated" Jews, forgetting how
distinctive and hence vulnerable they remained, ceased to rely enough
upon their own resources? A dangerous dependency can take more
than one form. Proper education usually equips one to distinguish
between healthy wariness and crippling paranoia.
Three grand objectives should be advocated for any people: Do the
right thing whenever possible; try to understand what is (this requires
an awareness of what is happening); advance your legitimate
interests-and hence be truly happy. Among the things to be
understood, if not even celebrated, is that there is a limit to anyone's
ability to control events, which is to recognize in effect that human
beings are indeed mortal. Even so, Abraham Lincoln's career testifies
to what can be accomplished by anyone determined to make use of the
meager opportunities that may happen to become available.
74. See supra Appendix A. See also Anastaplo, On Trial, supra note 2, at 854f, 935f.
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I conclude these Lincoln's Birthday remarks by returning to the
inquiry with which I began: What is likely to happen to race relations
in the United States? I have suggested that what happens among us, in
the foreseeable future, may well depend, in large part, upon what we
decide to do and to say.
EPILOGUE
Among the consequences of the Simpson trials has been the
instructive probing it has prompted of our chronic social problems.
Consider, for example, the following thoughtful letter by John Van
Doren in response (on February 12, 1997) to my talk, "The Future of
Race Relations in the United States" :
75
... The problem is intractable. Charity will not serve, nor is it
proper in social relations, where justice is required. Self-interest
will not serve; we do not believe our own advantageous position
will be lost, or if it may be it is as the sun is going to bum out-
too far off to matter (except in Los Angeles). Law will not
serve; we find ways to avoid or disobey it.
There are only two paths to the establishment of minorities in
this country: one is money, the other, politics. In the case of
African-Americans, neither of these is likely because they
require a cohesion that African-Americans lack.
Perhaps we should be thinking about ways to create such
cohesion, absent which any group is incapable of self-help.
Malcolm X went to Mecca and came back stunned to realize that
there was a world in which his kind was not despised-the world
of Islam-and in which all his old, terrible insecurity fell away.
Maybe we should encourage the adoption of Islam among
African-Americans.
We could also decide to undertake social efforts that would
require their labor, for which we would have to pay, as in
repairing our infrastructure. But that would have to take in
others as well, and is not foreseeable without another
Depression. Meantime we have plenty of Hispanics to
substitute. If the Chinese economy falters, as it shows signs of
doing, we'll have a billion Chinese to exploit as well.
Not that the steps you suggest won't be good. They will be,
some. I am glad you lay them out so well. But they won't cure
black anger, black despair, I don't think.
Mr. Van Doren (whose letter is used here with his permission)
seems to me eminently sensible in looking to the help available at this
75. See supra Appendix C. See also supra Appendix B.
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time from religious institutions.76 But it also seems to me that support
of the still-influential African-American churches is a more reliable
course in our circumstances then promotion of Islam, which would be
encumbered by the liabilities of the Black Muslim movement in this
country. (The most prominent spokesman today of that movement
has, for example, refused to notice publicly the substantial African
slavery permitted by his wealthy Arab sponsors in North Africa.77)
Besides, would it be useful for African-Americans to be further
segregated, in effect, by their religion?
Highly publicized trials can contribute to the training of citizens,
affecting thereby the forms that social problems and their attempted
solutions take. It should not hurt, and may even help, to have our
lawyers (and hence our judges) better educated than they can now be.
The best students respond to the best, as I have found in my law
school jurisprudence courses using the Bible and Shakespeare.78
76. For the perspective from which he approaches these matters, see John Van Doren,
Poetic Justice, in 1996 THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 258 (1996).
77. See, e.g., Paul Liben, Farrakhan Honors African Slavers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
1995, at A12. On what can be said for the Black Muslims, see Anastaplo, Slavery and
the Constitution, supra note 3, at 778. On Islam, see Anastaplo, An Introduction to
Islamic Thought, in 1989 THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 234 (1989)
78. See Anastaplo, Individualism, Professional Ethics, and the Sense of Community,
supra note 26, parts 5 and 6. See also supra note 8.
Justice Antonin Scalia, in a conference at Loyola University Chicago (April 1997),
scoffed at my suggestion that his "legal realism" jurisprudence is really "in the
mainstream." See Scalia Answers Critics, BLACKACRE, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law, April 22, 1997, at 1. My remarks about Justice Scalia on that occasion
had concluded with these observations:
The critiques I have collected here are anything but new. This should again
assure us that the reservations I have ventured to express about Justice Scalia's
constitutionalism are directed not against him personally but rather against
the dominant scholarly opinion today, a positivistic opinion which our
esteemed guest shares in principle, however much he may dissent on
secondary points which are not really as important as they may for the
moment appear.
My complete remarks may be found in BLACKACRE, May 6 1997. Further discussion of
Justice Scalia's work is scheduled for the 1997 Annual Convention of the American
Political Science Association.
